It’s sometimes easy to forget that winning in the Supreme Court — even the U.S. Supreme Court — doesn’t always get you what you want.

This week brought news about the aftermath of the landmark Caperton v. Massey Coal and Kelo decisions that must greatly disappoint the winning parties.

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Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., No. 08-0280 (Tex. Oct. 30, 2009) (DB)

Over at the Reverse and Render blog, Mike Northrup has a post about the Texas Supreme Court’s recent Aquaplex decision.

This was a commercial fraud case in which the defendant disputed intent, causation, and damages.

On the causation question, the Court looked to evidence of intent. In particular, discussing the filing of a lis pendens notice, the Court noted that the intent behind the filing was to stop the sale of property.

But the post at Reverse and Render wonders if letting evidence of that intent also prove the causation element of fraud “collapses” the fraud tort down into something too easy to prove:

It is unclear how this holding fits with prior precedent holding that evil motive or intent does not necessarily establish a cause of action. This opinion should give concern to those who file lis pendens. The purpose of lis pendens is give initial notice of a claim to property. According to the Aquaplex decision, the filing of a lis pendens might well constitute a complete claim for fraud.

Like Mike, I would also be surprised if the Court mean to loosen the requirement that causation be shown to support fraud damages. I think it’s more likely that this is an example of a complex fact pattern being difficult to squeeze into its per curiam opinion. With that in mind, it could be a mistake to rely too much on Aquaplex when crafting your next jury charge.

I wrote yesterday about a pending Fifth Circuit case about the “departing-lawyer rule” — determining which conflicts accompany a lawyer who leaves a large law firm.

That was fast. Today, the Fifth Circuit decided the case [PDF]. The Court looked for guidance both to the Texas Disciplinary Rules and the ABA Model Rules, concluding that neither created an “irrebuttable presumption” of conflict, as the lower court had concluded.

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The Fifth Circuit just heard oral arguments in a case about the scope of disqualification that follows a lawyer who leaves a large firm — the departing-lawyer rule. The case, Kirk A. Kennedy and Mark A. D’Andrea v. Mindprint Inc., arises out of Texas and is applying the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

The key question is whether Rule 1.09 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules creates an “irrebuttable” presumption that a departing lawyer had privileged information about every single matter being handled by his or her former firm — creating serious future conflicts for anyone who has ever walked the halls of a large law firm.

Read more about the case…

Now that we know Justice Eva Guzman of Houston’s Fourteenth Court of Appeals will be joining the Texas Supreme Court, we can start to figure how this appointment might affect the pending docket.

By my count, there are eight cases at various stages of the Texas Supreme Court’s docket in which Justice Guzman wrote the court of appeals opinion under review, including a case that was argued last month, D.R. Horton-Texas v. Markel International Insurance Co., No. 06-1018.

New Justices recuse themselves from cases in which they wrote the underlying opinion (of course), from those in which they were on the panel below (of course), and sometimes from other cases handled by their previous court of appeals. (( Under Rule 16.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellate judge “must recuse” when a case “presents a material issue which the justice or judge participated in deciding while serving on another court in which the proceeding was pending.”

The exact details will emerge over time, but this likely includes cases on which Justice Guzman cast a vote on a motion for en banc consideration. Depending on the Fourteenth Court’s internal procedures, there may be other cases in which she would have had a significant enough role to now recuse herself. ))

The Fourteenth Court on which Justice Guzman sits is quite busy. A list of the cases on the Texas Supreme Court’s docket that originated from that court of appeals is available on this DocketDB page. (( Registered users of DocketDB can browse these details for each court of appeals, each court of appeals justice, and each Texas county. )) One of those pending cases is Robinson v. Crown Cork & Steel Co., No. 06-0714, about the constitutionality of certain limits on asbestos litigation.

My phone started buzzing a few minutes ago with news that Justice Eva Guzman of Houston’s Fourteenth Court of Appeals will be named to the open seat on the Texas Supreme Court.

The Houston Chronicle has this story with the news and more background.

Justice Guzman’s official judicial biography is here.

In Texas, the Governor’s nominee for a vacant seat does not have to be confirmed by the Texas Senate until it convenes again. (( The Texas Legislature meets in the spring of odd-numbered years, unless convened to special session by the Governor. )) With that in mind, Justice Guzman can start preparing for the 2010 elections, during which she will stand for a six-year term.

While I was out of town, I missed this list of 27 applicants for Justice Brister’s now open seat on the Texas Supreme Court, compiled by Texas Weekly from records released by Perry’s office.

If you haven’t started your office pool yet, time is probably running out.

This morning, the US Supreme Court has asked for the views of the Texas Solicitor General about a pending petition. At least in my memory, that’s a first.

The case is Rhine v. Deaton (08-1596), which I blogged about earlier today. My earlier post includes links that will take you to the Texas Supreme Court briefing and Texas court of appeals opinions.

I would write a little more about this now, but I’m writing from the passenger seat of a car in the mountains of West Virginia.

See also: SCOTUSblog’s first note this morning about the order.